Root DNSSEC Design Team T. Okubo
VeriSign
F. Ljunggren
Kirei
R. Lamb
ICANN
J. Schlyter
Kirei
May 28, 2010
DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone ZSK operator
Abstract
This document is the DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) for the Root
Zone Zone Signing Key (ZSK) operator. It states the practices and
provisions that are used to provide Root Zone Signing and Zone
distribution services. These include, but are not limited to:
issuing, managing, changing and distributing DNS keys in accordance
with the specific requirements of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Copyright Notice
Copyright 2010 by VeriSign, Inc., and by Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers. This work is based on the Certification
Practice Statement, Copyright 1996-2004 by VeriSign, Inc. Used by
Permission. All Rights Reserved.
Trademark Notices
VERISIGN is a registered trademark of VeriSign, Inc.
ICANN is a registered trademark of The Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers.
Okubo, et al. [Page 1]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Document name and identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. Community and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1. IANA Functions Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.2. Root Zone Administrator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.3. Root Zone Maintainer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.4. Root Server Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.5. Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.6. Root Zone Zone Signing Key Operator . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.7. Child zone manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.8. Relying Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.9. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4. Specification Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.1. Specification administration organization . . . . . . 10
1.4.2. Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4.3. Specification change procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1. Repositories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2. Publication of key signing keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3. Access controls on repositories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Meaning of domain names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2. Activation of DNSSEC for child zone . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3. Identification and authentication of child zone manager . 12
3.4. Registration of delegation signer (DS) records . . . . . . 12
3.5. Method to prove possession of private key . . . . . . . . 12
3.6. Removal of DS resource records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6.1. Who can request removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6.2. Procedure for removal request . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6.3. Emergency removal request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Physical Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.1. Site location and construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.2. Physical access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.3. Power and air conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.4. Water exposures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.5. Fire prevention and protection . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.6. Media storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.7. Waste disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1.8. Off-site backup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Procedural Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.1. Trusted roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.2. Number of persons required per task . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role . . . 16
4.2.4. Tasks requiring separation of duties . . . . . . . . . 16
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Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
4.3. Personnel Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance
requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.2. Background check procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3.3. Training requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.7. Contracting personnel requirements . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel . . . . . . . . . 18
4.4. Audit Logging Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.4.1. Types of events recorded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4.2. Frequency of processing log . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.4.3. Retention period for audit log . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4.4. Protection of audit log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4.5. Audit log backup procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4.6. Audit collection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject . . . . . . . . 21
4.4.8. Vulnerability assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5. Compromise and Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures . . . . . 21
4.5.2. Corrupted computing resources, software, and/or
data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5.3. Entity private key compromise procedures . . . . . . . 21
4.5.4. Business Continuity and IT Disaster Recovery
Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.6. Entity termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1.1. Key pair generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1.2. Public key delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.3. Public key parameters generation and quality
checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.4. Key usage purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2. Private key protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls . . . . . 24
5.2.2. Private key (m-of-n) multi-person control . . . . . . 24
5.2.3. Private key escrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.4. Private key backup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.5. Private key storage on cryptographic module . . . . . 25
5.2.6. Private key archival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.7. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic
module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.8. Method of activating private key . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.9. Method of deactivating private key . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.10. Method of destroying private key . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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5.3.1. Public key archival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3.2. Key usage periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4. Activation data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4.1. Activation data generation and installation . . . . . 26
5.4.2. Activation data protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.4.3. Other aspects of activation data . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.5. Computer Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.6. Network Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.7. Timestamping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.8. Life Cycle Technical Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.8.1. System development controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5.8.2. Security management controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.8.3. Life cycle security controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6. ZONE SIGNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1. Key lengths and algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2. Authenticated denial of existence . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3. Signature format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.4. Zone signing key roll-over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.5. Key signing key roll-over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.6. Signature life-time and re-signing frequency . . . . . . . 29
6.7. Verification of zone signing key set . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.8. Verification of resource records . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.9. Resource records time-to-live . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7. COMPLIANCE AUDIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.1. Frequency of entity compliance audit . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.2. Identity/qualifications of auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.3. Auditor's relationship to audited party . . . . . . . . . 32
7.4. Topics covered by audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency . . . . . . . . . 33
7.6. Communication of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8. LEGAL MATTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.1. Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.2. Financial responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.3. Confidentiality of business information . . . . . . . . . 33
8.3.1. Scope of confidential information . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential
information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information . . 34
8.4. Privacy of personal information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.4.1. Information treated as private . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.4.2. Information not deemed private . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.4.3. Responsibility to protect private information . . . . 34
8.4.4. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative
Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.5. Limitations of liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
8.6. Term and termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.6.1. Term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.6.2. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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8.6.3. Dispute resolution provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8.6.4. Governing law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix A. Table of acronyms and definitions . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.1. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
A.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix B. History of changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
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Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
1. INTRODUCTION
This document is the VeriSign DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) as the
Root Zone (RZ) Zone Signing Key (ZSK) Operator. It states the
practices and provisions that VeriSign on behalf of the U.S.
Department of Commerce (DoC), employ in providing Root Zone Signing
and Zone distribution services that include, but are not limited to,
issuing, managing, changing and distributing DNS keys in accordance
with the specific requirements of the DoC.
1.1. Overview
The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is a set of IETF
specifications for adding origin authentication and data integrity to
the Domain Name System. DNSSEC provides a way for software to
validate that Domain Name System (DNS) data have not been modified
during Internet transit. This is done by incorporating public key
cryptography into the DNS hierarchy to form a chain of trust
originating at the root zone.
The DNS was not originally designed with strong security mechanisms
to provide integrity and authenticity of DNS data. Over the years, a
number of vulnerabilities have been discovered that threaten the
reliability and trustworthiness of the system. DNSSEC addresses
these vulnerabilities by adding data origin authentication, data
integrity verification and authenticated denial of existence
capabilities to the DNS.
This DPS is specifically applicable to The Root Zone Maintainer and
Root Zone Zone Signing Key Operator. More generally, this document
will provide the governing policies and provisions as it relates to
the management, security and technical specifications of DNSSEC
operation at the Root. This document will be under the control and
management of VeriSign with guidance and direction from the DoC.
Information in this document and subsequent documents will be made
public as required.
The DPS is only one of a set of documents relevant to VeriSign's
management of the Root Zone's ZSK. Other documents include:
ancillary confidential security and operational documents that
supplement the DPS by providing more detailed requirements, such as:
The VeriSign Physical Security Policy, which sets forth security
principles governing the DPS infrastructure, The VeriSign Information
and Physical Security Policies and VeriSign Security and Audit
Requirements which describes detailed requirements for VeriSign
concerning personnel, physical, telecommunications, logical, and
cryptographic key management security, and Key Ceremony Reference
Guide, which presents detailed key management operational
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Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
requirements. In many instances, the DPS refers to these ancillary
documents for specific, detailed practices implementing VeriSign
proprietary standards where including the specifics in the DPS could
compromise the security of the RZ ZSK's operation.
1.2. Document name and identification
Document title:
DNSSEC Practice Statement for the DNS Root Zone Maintainer
Version:
00 ($Revision: 1400 $)
Date:
$Date: 2010-06-07 17:31:31 -0400 (Mon, 07 Jun 2010) $
1.3. Community and Applicability
1.3.1. IANA Functions Operator
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) acts
as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions Operator
under contract to the U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (DoC/NTIA). The
IANA Functions Operator accepts change requests to the contents of
the Root Zone from the Top Level Domain (TLD) Operators and validates
those requests. After validation occurs, the IANA Functions Operator
submits the requests to the DoC/NTIA for authorization and sends a
copy to the Root Zone Maintainer for implementation once
authorization is received.
1.3.2. Root Zone Administrator
The Root Zone Administrator is the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, which is an agency in the U.S. Department
of Commerce that performs the authorization for changes to the Root
Zone. This role differs from the third party auditors who conduct
the compliance audit and generates the audit report.
1.3.3. Root Zone Maintainer
VeriSign, per the Cooperative Agreement with the U.S. Department of
Commerce, is acting as the Root Zone Maintainer. The Root Zone
Maintainer is performing the function of receiving change requests to
the Root Zone from the IANA Functions Operator, receiving
authorization to make changes to the Root Zone from the Root Zone
Administrator, implementing the changes, generating a new Root Zone
File and distributing it to the Root Server Operators.
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Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
1.3.4. Root Server Operators
The Root Server Operators consists of 12 different professional
engineering entities responsible for providing the root zone to the
public via the 13 Root Zone Authoritative Name Servers. The Root
Server Operators are not involved in the making of any policies or
modification of data.
1.3.5. Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator
ICANN is the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator (as the IANA
Functions Operator) performing the function of generating the Root
Zone's Key Signing Key (KSK) and signing the Root Keyset, including
the Root Zone Zone Signing Key (RZ ZSK), using the KSK. The Root
Zone KSK Operator is also responsible for securely generating and
storing the private keys and distributing the public portion of the
KSK as the Trust Anchor to the relying parties.
The Root Zone KSK (RZ KSK) operator is responsible for:
(1) Generating and protecting the private component of the RZ KSK.
(2) Securely importing public key components from the RZ ZSK
Operator.
(3) Authenticating and validating the public RZ ZSK keyset.
(4) Securely signing the RZ ZSK keyset.
(5) Securely transmitting the signed RZ ZSK key set to the RZ ZSK
Operator.
(6) Securely exporting the RZ KSK public key components.
(7) Issuing an emergency key roll-over within a reasonable time if
any private key component associated with the zone is lost or
suspected to be compromised.
1.3.6. Root Zone Zone Signing Key Operator
The Root Zone Zone Signing Key Operator is VeriSign performing the
function of generating the Root Zone's Zone Signing Key (ZSK) and
signing the Root Zone File using the ZSK.
The Root Zone Zone Signing Key (RZ ZSK) Operator is also responsible
for securely generating and storing the private keys and distributing
the public portion of the ZSK to the RZ KSK Operator for signing.
The Root Zone ZSK (RZ ZSK) operator is responsible for:
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Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
(1) Generating and protecting the private component of the RZ ZSK.
(2) Securely exporting and transmitting the public RZ ZSK component
to the RZ KSK Operator.
(3) Securely importing the signed RZ ZSK keyset from the RZ KSK
operator.
(4) Signing the Root Zone's resource records (optionally omitting
the DNSKEY resource record).
(5) Issue emergency key roll-over within a reasonable amount of time
if any private key associated with the zone is lost or suspected
to be compromised.
1.3.7. Child zone manager
The child zone (TLD) manager is a trustee for the delegated domain,
and as such responsible for providing registry services and operating
subordinate DNS servers. If a child zone is signed using DNSSEC, the
child zone manager is also responsible for:
(1) Generating the keys associated with its zone using a trustworthy
method.
(2) Registering and maintaining the shorthand representations of its
Key Signing Key (Delegation Signer Resource Record) in the
parent zone to establish the chain of trust.
(3) Taking reasonable precautions to prevent any loss, disclosure or
unauthorized use of the keys associated with its zone.
(4) Issuing emergency key roll-over within reasonable time if any
private key associated with its zone is lost or suspected to be
compromised.
1.3.8. Relying Party
A Relying Party is the entity relying on DNSSEC, such as security-
aware validating resolvers and other applications performing
validation of DNSSEC signatures.
The relying party must properly configure and update the Trust Anchor
as appropriate. The automated method described in RFC 5011 [RFC5011]
may be used.
Relying parties must also stay informed of any critical changes in
the Root Zone operation as notified by ICANN in accordance with Root
Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS section 2.1. [RZKSKDPS]
1.3.9. Applicability
This DPS is only applicable to the Root Zone, and more specifically
the RZ ZSK Operator. Each link in the chain of trust may have
entirely different requirements that can affect the end entity, and
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Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
is not governed by this DPS.
Entities must evaluate their own environments and its associated
threats and vulnerabilities to determine the level of risk they are
willing to accept.
1.4. Specification Administration
This DPS will be periodically reviewed and updated, as appropriate by
the RZ ZSK Operator Policy Management Authority (PMA). The PMA is
responsible for the management of the DPS and should be considered as
the point of contact for all matters related to the DPS. The PMA
notifies, and when appropriate, seeks the review and authorization
from DoC prior to taking action and/or modification of the DPS.
1.4.1. Specification administration organization
VeriSign Inc
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166
USA
1.4.2. Contact Information
The DPS Practices Manager
VeriSign DNSSEC Policy Management Authority
c/o VeriSign, Inc
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166
USA
+1 (703) 948-3200 (voice)
+1 (703) 421-4873 (fax)
dnspractices@verisign.com
1.4.3. Specification change procedures
Amendments to this DPS are made by the VeriSign DNSSEC Policy
Management Authority (PMA). Amendments will either be in the form of
a document containing an amended form of the DPS or an update.
Amended versions or updates will be linked to the Practices Updates
and Notices section of the VeriSign Repository located at:
https://www.verisign.com/repository/updates. (See section 2 for a
more detailed explanation of Repositories.) Updates supersede any
designated or conflicting provisions of the referenced version of the
DPS.
The PMA reserves the right to amend the DPS without notification for
amendments that are not material, including without limitation
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Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
corrections of typographical errors, changes to URLs, and changes to
contact information. The PMA's decision to designate amendments as
material or non-material is within the PMA's sole discretion.
Proposed amendments to the DPS will appear in the Practices Updates
and Notices section of the VeriSign Repository, which is located at:
https://www.verisign.com/repository/updates. The PMA solicits
proposed amendments to the DPS from the community. If the PMA
considers such an amendment desirable and proposes to implement the
amendment, the PMA will provide public notice of such amendment in
accordance with this section. Notwithstanding anything in the DPS,
to the contrary, if the PMA believes that material amendments to the
DPS are necessary immediately to stop or prevent a breach of the
security of any portion of it, the PMA is entitled to make such
amendments by publication in the VeriSign Repository. Such
amendments will be effective immediately upon publication.
2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORIES
2.1. Repositories
VeriSign, as the ZSK Operator, publishes the DPS in the VeriSign
repository section of VeriSign's web site at
https://www.verisign.com/repository/. Public access to this
repository will include the option of using an HTTPS-authenticated
channel.
2.2. Publication of key signing keys
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
2.3. Access controls on repositories
Information published in the repository portion of the VeriSign web
site is publicly-accessible information. Read only access to such
information is unrestricted. VeriSign has implemented logical and
physical security measures to prevent unauthorized persons from
adding, deleting, or modifying repository entries.
3. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
3.1. Meaning of domain names
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
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3.2. Activation of DNSSEC for child zone
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
3.3. Identification and authentication of child zone manager
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
3.4. Registration of delegation signer (DS) records
VeriSign, as the Root Zone Maintainer, applies changes to the Root
Zone file based on requests from the IANA Functions Operator and
authorized by the Root Zone Administrator.
3.5. Method to prove possession of private key
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
3.6. Removal of DS resource records
3.6.1. Who can request removal
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
3.6.2. Procedure for removal request
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
3.6.3. Emergency removal request
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
4. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS
4.1. Physical Controls
As the RZ ZSK Operator, VeriSign has implemented the VeriSign
Physical Security Policy, which supports the security requirements of
this DPS. Compliance with these policies is included in VeriSign's
independent audit requirements described in section 7. VeriSign
Physical Security Policy contains sensitive security information and
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Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
is only available upon agreement with VeriSign. An overview of the
requirements is described below.
4.1.1. Site location and construction
VeriSign DNSSEC operations are conducted within a physically
protected environment that deters, prevents, and detects unauthorized
use of, access to, or disclosure of sensitive information and systems
whether covert or overt. VeriSign also maintains disaster recovery
facilities for its DNSSEC operations. VeriSign's disaster recovery
facilities are protected by multiple tiers of physical security
comparable to those of VeriSign's primary facility.
4.1.2. Physical access
VeriSign DNSSEC systems are protected by a minimum of four tiers of
physical security, with access to the lower tier required before
gaining access to the higher tier. Progressively restrictive
physical access privileges control access to each tier. Sensitive
DNSSEC operational activity, any activity related to the lifecycle of
the RZ ZSK, occur within very restrictive physical tiers. Access to
each tier requires the use of a proximity card employee badge.
Physical access is automatically logged and video recorded.
Additional tiers enforce individual access control through the use of
two factor authentication including biometrics. Unescorted
personnel, including visitors or employees without specific
authorization, are not allowed into such secured areas. The physical
security system includes additional tiers for key management security
which serves to protect both online and offline storage of Hardware
Security Modules (HSM) and keying material.
Areas used to create and store cryptographic material enforce dual
control, each through the use of two factor authentication including
biometrics. Online HSMs are protected through the use of locked
cabinets. Offline HSMs are protected through the use of tamper-
evident bags, locked safes, cabinets and containers. Access to HSMs
and keying material is restricted in accordance with VeriSign's
segregation of duties requirements. The opening and closing of
cabinets or containers in these tiers is logged for audit purposes.
4.1.3. Power and air conditioning
VeriSign's secure facilities are equipped with primary and backup:
-power systems to ensure continuous, uninterrupted access to electric
power and -heating/ventilation/air conditioning systems to control
temperature and relative humidity.
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4.1.4. Water exposures
VeriSign has taken reasonable precautions to minimize the impact of
water exposure to VeriSign systems.
4.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
VeriSign has taken reasonable precautions to prevent and extinguish
fires or other damaging exposure to flame or smoke. VeriSign's fire
prevention and protection measures have been designed to comply with
local fire safety regulations.
4.1.6. Media storage
All media containing production software and data, audit, archive, or
backup information is stored within VeriSign facilities or in a
secure off-site storage facility with appropriate physical and
logical access controls designed to limit access to authorized
personnel and protect such media from accidental damage (e.g., water,
fire, and electromagnetic).
4.1.7. Waste disposal
Sensitive documents and materials are shredded before disposal.
Media used to collect or transmit sensitive information are rendered
unreadable before disposal. Cryptographic devices are physically
destroyed or zeroized in accordance with the manufacturers' guidance
prior to disposal. Other waste is disposed of in accordance with
VeriSign's normal waste disposal requirements.
4.1.8. Off-site backup
VeriSign performs routine backups of critical system data, audit log
data, and other sensitive information. Off-site backup media are
stored in a physically secure manner using a bonded third party
storage facility and VeriSign's East Coast disaster recovery
facility.
4.2. Procedural Controls
4.2.1. Trusted roles
VeriSign considers the categories of personnel identified in this
section as Trusted Persons having a Trusted Position. Persons
seeking to become Trusted Persons by obtaining a Trusted Position
must successfully complete the screening requirements set out in this
DPS.
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Trusted Persons include all employees, contractors, and consultants
that have access to or control operations that may materially affect:
o Generation and protection of the private component of the Root
Zone Zone Signing Key;
o Secure export or import of any public components; and
o Generation and signing Zone File data.
Trusted roles include, but are not limited to:
o Naming resolution operations personnel;
o Cryptographic business operations personnel;
o Security personnel;
o System administration personnel;
o Designated engineering personnel; and
o Executives that are designated to manage infrastructural
trustworthiness.
4.2.2. Number of persons required per task
VeriSign has established, maintains, and enforces rigorous control
procedures to ensure the segregation of duties based on job
responsibility and to ensure that multiple Trusted Persons are
required to perform sensitive tasks. Policy and control procedures
are in place to ensure segregation of duties based on job
responsibilities.
The most sensitive tasks, such as access to and management of
cryptographic hardware (HSM) and associated key material require
multiple Trusted Persons. These internal control procedures are
designed to ensure that at a minimum, two trusted personnel are
required to have either physical or logical access to the device.
Access to cryptographic hardware is strictly enforced by multiple
Trusted Persons throughout its lifecycle, from incoming receipt and
inspection to final logical and/or physical destruction. Once a
module is activated with operational keys, further access controls
are invoked to maintain split control over physical access to the
device. Persons with physical access to modules do not hold "Secret
Shares" and vice versa.
Other manual operations such as the signing of Zone File Data,
require the participation of at least 2 Trusted Persons, or a
combination of at least one trusted person and an automated process.
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4.2.3. Identification and authentication for each role
For all personnel seeking to become Trusted Persons, verification of
identity is performed through the personal (physical) presence of
such personnel before Trusted Persons performing VeriSign Human
Resources or security functions and a check of well-recognized forms
of identification (e.g., passports and driver's licenses). Identity
is further confirmed through the background checking procedures in
DPS section 4.3. VeriSign ensures that personnel have achieved
Trusted Status and departmental approval has been given before such
personnel are:
o issued access devices and granted access to the required
facilities,
o issued electronic credentials to access and perform specific
functions on VeriSign IT systems.
4.2.4. Tasks requiring separation of duties
Tasks requiring separation of duties include but are not limited to
the generation, implementation or destruction of Root Zone DNSSEC key
material.
Personnel holding a role in the multi-party access to the RZ KSK do
not hold a role in the multi-party access to the RZ ZSK, or vice
versa. Designated audit personnel may not participate in the multi-
person control for the RZ ZSK or KSK.
4.3. Personnel Controls
4.3.1. Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
VeriSign requires that personnel seeking to become Trusted Persons
present proof of the requisite background, qualifications, and
experience needed to perform their prospective job responsibilities
competently and satisfactorily, as well as proof of any government
clearances, if any, necessary to perform operations under government
contracts.
4.3.2. Background check procedures
All personnel with access to any cryptographic component used with
the Root Zone Signing process are required to pass a background check
extending back at least three years.
Prior to commencement of employment in a Trusted Role, VeriSign
conducts background checks which include the following:
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o Confirmation of previous employment
o Check of professional references
o Confirmation of the highest or most relevant educational degree
obtained
o Check of credit/financial records to the extent allowed by
national laws for the individual's country of residence
o Search of criminal records (local, state or provincial, and
national)
o Search of drive's license records
o Search of Social Security Administration records
To the extent that any of the requirements imposed by this section
cannot be met due to a prohibition or limitation in local law or
other circumstances, VeriSign will utilize a substitute investigative
technique permitted by law that provides substantially similar
information, including but not limited to obtaining a background
check performed by the applicable governmental agency.
The factors revealed in a background check that may be considered
grounds for rejecting candidates for Trusted Positions or for taking
action against an existing Trusted Person generally include (but are
not limited to) the following:
o Misrepresentations made by the candidate or Trusted Person,
o Highly unfavorable or unreliable professional references,
o Indications of a lack of financial responsibility.
o Certain criminal convictions
Reports containing such information are evaluated by VeriSign human
resources and security personnel, who determine the appropriate
course of action in light of the type, magnitude, and frequency of
the behavior uncovered by the background check.
Such actions may include measures up to and including the
cancellation of offers of employment made to candidates for Trusted
Positions or the termination of existing Trusted Persons. The use of
information revealed in a background check to take such actions is
subject to the applicable federal, state, and local laws.
4.3.3. Training requirements
VeriSign provides its personnel with training upon hire as well as
the requisite on-the-job training needed for them to perform their
job responsibilities competently and satisfactorily. VeriSign
periodically reviews and enhances its training programs as necessary.
VeriSign's training programs are tailored to the individuals
responsibilities and include the following as relevant:
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o Basic DNS/DNSSEC concepts
o Job responsibilities
o Use and operation of deployed hardware and software
o Security and operational policies and procedures
o Incident and compromise reporting and handling
o Disaster recovery and business continuity procedures
4.3.4. Retraining frequency and requirements
VeriSign provides refresher training and updates to their personnel
to the extent and frequency required to ensure that such personnel
maintain the required level of proficiency to perform their job
responsibilities competently and satisfactorily.
4.3.5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
Positions are rotated and replaced as needed.
4.3.6. Sanctions for unauthorized actions
Appropriate disciplinary actions are taken for unauthorized actions
with respect to this DPS and/or other violations of VeriSign policies
and procedures. Disciplinary actions may include measures up to and
including termination and are commensurate with the frequency and
severity of the unauthorized actions.
4.3.7. Contracting personnel requirements
In limited circumstances, independent contractors or consultants may
be used to fill Trusted Positions. Any such contractor or consultant
is held to the same functional and security criteria that apply to a
VeriSign employees in a comparable position. Independent contractors
and consultants who have not completed or passed the background check
procedures specified in DPS section 4.3 are permitted access to
VeriSign's secure facilities only to the extent they are escorted and
directly supervised by Trusted Persons at all times.
4.3.8. Documentation supplied to personnel
VeriSign provides its employees the requisite training and other
documentation needed to perform their job responsibilities
competently and satisfactorily.
4.4. Audit Logging Procedures
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4.4.1. Types of events recorded
VeriSign manually or automatically logs the following significant
events:
RZ ZSK key life cycle management events, including:
o Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and
destruction
o Exporting of public key components
o Cryptographic device life cycle management events
RZ ZSK signing and management events, including:
o Key activation
o Receipt and validation of signed public key material (from the KSK
operator)
o Successful or unsuccessful signing requests
o Key rollover events
Security-related events, including:
o Successful and unsuccessful system access attempts
o Key and security system actions performed by trusted personnel
o Security sensitive files or records read, written or deleted
o Security profile changes
o System crashes, hardware failures and other anomalies
o Firewall and router activity
o Facility visitor entry/exit
o System changes and maintenance/system updates
o Incident response handling
Log entries include the following elements:
o Date and time of the entry,
o Identity of the entity making the journal entry,
o Serial or sequence number of entry, for automatic journal entries,
o Kind of entry.
Other events as appropriate.
All types of audit information will contain correct time and date
information.
4.4.2. Frequency of processing log
Audit logs are examined on at least a weekly basis for significant
security and operational events. In addition, VeriSign reviews its
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audit logs for suspicious or unusual activity in response to alerts
generated based on irregularities and incidents within the VeriSign
Zone Signing systems. Audit log processing consists of a review of
the audit logs and documentation for all significant events in an
audit log summary. Audit log reviews include a verification that the
log has not been tampered with and an investigation of any alerts or
irregularities in the logs. Actions taken based on audit log reviews
are also documented.
4.4.3. Retention period for audit log
All audit data collected in terms of section 4.4.1 is retained on-
site for at least one (1) year after creation and is thereafter
archived for at least 10 years.
The media holding the audit data and the applications required to
process the information will be maintained to ensure that the archive
data can be accessed for the time period set forth in this DPS.
4.4.4. Protection of audit log
Audit logs are protected with an electronic audit log system that
includes mechanisms to protect the log files from unauthorized
viewing, modification, deletion, or other tampering.
Only authorized Trusted Personnel are able to obtain direct access to
the audit information. The integrity of the audit log information
will be verified by validating the digital signatures before handing
the information over to the designated auditor.
4.4.5. Audit log backup procedures
VeriSign incrementally backs up electronic archives of its Root ZSK
information on a daily basis and performs full backups on a weekly
basis. Copies of paper-based records will be maintained in an off-
site secure facility.
4.4.6. Audit collection system
Automated audit data is generated and recorded at the application,
network and operating system level. Manually generated audit data is
recorded by VeriSign personnel.
Electronic information is incrementally backed up and copies of
paper-based records are made as new records are entered in the
archive. These backups are maintained in an off-site secure
facility.
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4.4.7. Notification to event-causing subject
Where an event is logged by the audit collection system, no notice is
required to be given to the individual, organization, device, or
application that caused the event.
4.4.8. Vulnerability assessments
Events in the audit process are logged, in part, to monitor system
vulnerabilities. Security vulnerability assessments ("SVAs") are
performed, reviewed, and revised following an examination of these
monitored events. SVAs are based on automated logging data and are
performed on a ad-hoc, daily, monthly, and annual basis. An annual
SVA will be an input into an entity's annual Compliance Audit.
4.5. Compromise and Disaster Recovery
4.5.1. Incident and compromise handling procedures
Backups of audit data, and database records are kept in off-site
storage and made are available in the event of a Compromise or
disaster.
Back-ups of private keys will be generated and maintained in
accordance with the DPS section 5.2.4. All incidents will be
communicated to NTIA in a reasonable timeframe.
4.5.2. Corrupted computing resources, software, and/or data
In the event of the corruption of computing resources, software,
and/or data, such an occurrence is reported to VeriSign Information
Security and VeriSign's incident handling procedures are implemented.
Such procedures require appropriate escalation, incident
investigation, and incident response. If necessary, VeriSign's key
compromise or disaster recovery procedures will be implemented.
4.5.3. Entity private key compromise procedures
4.5.3.1. Key Signing Key compromise
VeriSign will support Root Zone Key Signing Key emergency rollover in
the case of RZ KSK compromise while following ICANN's procedural
direction, as outlined in Root Zone KSK Signing Key Operator's DPS
[RZKSKDPS].
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4.5.3.2. Zone Signing Key compromise
Procedures are in place for unscheduled rollovers. In addition,
plans and procedures are in place for key compromise situations.
Upon the suspected or known Compromise of the Root Zone ZSK,
VeriSign's Key Compromise Response procedures are enacted by the
VeriSign Security Incident Response Team (VSIRT). This team, which
includes Information Security, Cryptographic Business Operations,
Production Services personnel, and other VeriSign management
representatives, assess the situation, develop an appropriate action
plan in accordance with VeriSign's information security policy and
implement the action plan with approval from VeriSign executive
management and PMA.
4.5.4. Business Continuity and IT Disaster Recovery Capabilities
VeriSign has implemented a disaster recovery site that is physically
and geographically separate from VeriSign's principal secure
facilities for signing operations. VeriSign has developed,
implemented and tested business continuity and IT disaster recovery
plan to mitigate the effects of natural, man-made, or technological
disasters. These plans are regularly tested, validated, and updated
to be operational in the event of any incident or disaster. Detailed
business continuity and IT disaster recovery plans are in place to
address the restoration of information systems services and key
business functions.
VeriSign has in place a formal Incident Response Team which is
supported by a formal Corporate Incident Management Team (CIMT) and
business unit Business Continuity Teams to respond to and manage any
incident or disaster that impacts VeriSign employees, operations,
environments, and facilities. VeriSign's IT disaster recovery site
has implemented the physical security protections and operational
controls required by VeriSign Physical Security Policies and VeriSign
Security and Audit Requirements to provide for a secure and sound
backup operational environment. In the event of a natural or man-
made, or technological incident or disaster that requires temporary
or permanent cessation of operations from VeriSign's primary
facility, VeriSign's business continuity and IT disaster recovery
process is initiated by the VeriSign Incident Response Team (IRT) and
Corporate Incident Management Team (CIMT). Because root zone signing
operations on a validated zone file are performed actively,
independently and redundantly in both facilities, manual intervention
is not required in order for the following functions to proceed
following a disaster at either site:
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o Signing a Zone File
o Distributing the Signed Zone File
VeriSign's disaster recovery environment is protected by physical
security protections comparable to the physical security tiers
specified in DPS section 4.1.2. VeriSign tests its environment at
its primary site to support all functions to include DNSSEC
functions. Results of such tests are reviewed and kept for audit and
planning purposes. VeriSign maintains redundant hardware and backups
of its infrastructure system software at its IT disaster recovery
facility. In addition, private keys are backed up and maintained for
disaster recovery purposes in accordance with DPS section 5.2.4.
4.6. Entity termination
VeriSign has implemented a DNSSEC termination plan in the event that
the roles and responsibilities of the Root Zone ZSK Operator must
transition to other entities. VeriSign will co-ordinate with the
IANA Functions Operator, Root Zone KSK Operator and DoC in order to
execute the transition in a secure and transparent manner.
The DNSSEC termination plan also includes procedures in the case of
IANA Functions Operator and/or Root Zone KSK Operator termination.
5. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
5.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation
5.1.1. Key pair generation
Root Zone (RZ) Zone Signing Key (ZSK) key pair generation is
performed by multiple pre-selected, trained and trusted individuals
using Trustworthy Systems and processes that provide for the security
and required cryptographic strength for the generated keys.The
cryptographic modules used for RZ ZSK key generation meet the
requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 4.
All ZSK key pairs are generated in pre-planned Key Generation
Ceremonies in accordance with the requirements of the Key Ceremony
Reference Guide and other applicable policies. The activities
performed in each key generation ceremony are recorded, dated and
signed by all individuals involved. These records are kept for audit
and tracking purposes as required in section 4.4.3.
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5.1.2. Public key delivery
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
5.1.3. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
For the current key size, primality testing of RSA parameters (p and
q) will be performed to ensure with the probability of less than
2^-100 that the numbers are not composite.
Quality checking will also include validating the size of the public
exponent to be both resource-efficient and secure.
5.1.4. Key usage purposes
Any root zone ZSK private key will only be used for signing the
relevant root zones RRset or self-signing with the same scheme to
provide proof of possession of the private key.
Any resulting RRSIG record will have a validity period that is no
longer than 10 days, and will not extend more than 10 days in to the
future.
5.2. Private key protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
Controls
All cryptographic functions involving the private component of the
ZSK are performed within the HSM; that is, the private component will
not be exported from the HSM except in encrypted form for purposes of
key backup.
5.2.1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
For RZ ZSK key pair generation and RZ ZSK private key storage,
VeriSign uses HSMs that are certified at FIPS 140-2 Level 4.
5.2.2. Private key (m-of-n) multi-person control
VeriSign has implemented technical and procedural mechanisms that
require the participation of multiple trusted individuals to perform
sensitive cryptographic operations. VeriSign uses "Secret Sharing"
to split the activation data needed to make use of a RZ ZSK private
key into separate parts called "Secret Shares" which are held by
trained and trusted individuals called "Shareholders." A threshold
number of Secret Shares (m) out of the total number of Secret Shares
created and distributed for a particular HSM (n) is required to
activate a RZ ZSK private key stored on the module. The threshold
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number of shares needed to sign a root Zone File is 3. It should be
noted that the number of shares distributed for disaster recovery
tokens may be less than the number distributed for operational HSMs,
while the threshold number of required shares remains the same.
Secret Shares are protected in accordance with this DPS.
5.2.3. Private key escrow
Private components of Root Zone ZSKs are not escrowed.
5.2.4. Private key backup
VeriSign creates backup copies of RZ ZSK private keys for routine
recovery and disaster recovery purposes. Such keys are stored in
encrypted form within hardware cryptographic modules and associated
key storage devices. Cryptographic modules used for private key
storage meet the requirements of this DPS. Private keys are copied
to backup hardware cryptographic modules in accordance with this DPS.
Modules containing on-site backup copies of RZ ZSK private keys are
subject to the requirements of this DPS. Modules containing disaster
recovery copies of RZ ZSK private keys are subject to the
requirements of this DPS.
5.2.5. Private key storage on cryptographic module
Private keys held on hardware cryptographic modules are stored in
encrypted form.
5.2.6. Private key archival
RZ ZSK key pairs do not expire. Superseded key pairs will be
securely retained within HSMs that meet the requirements of this DPS.
These key pairs will not be used for any signing events after their
supersession.
5.2.7. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
VeriSign generates RZ ZSK key pairs on the HSMs in which the keys
will be used. In addition, VeriSign makes copies of such key pairs
for routine recovery and disaster recovery purposes. Where key pairs
are backed up to another HSM, such key pairs are transported between
modules in encrypted form.
5.2.8. Method of activating private key
The RZ ZSK private key will be activated using 3 of 16 M of N Secret
Shares
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5.2.9. Method of deactivating private key
VeriSign RZ ZSK private keys are deactivated upon system shutdown.
5.2.10. Method of destroying private key
Where required, VeriSign destroys RZ ZSK private keys in a manner
that reasonably ensures that there are no residual remains of the
keys that could lead to the reconstruction of the keys. VeriSign
utilizes the zeroization function of its HSMs and other appropriate
means to ensure the complete destruction of RZ ZSK private keys.
When performed, private key destruction activities are logged.
5.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
5.3.1. Public key archival
RZ ZSK public keys are backed up and archived.
5.3.2. Key usage periods
The Operational Period of a RZ ZSK ends upon its supersession. The
superseded RZ ZSK will never be reused to sign a resource record
while in retention.
5.4. Activation data
5.4.1. Activation data generation and installation
Activation data (Secret Shares) used to protect HSMs containing RZ
ZSK private keys is generated in accordance with the requirements of
DPS section 5.1. The creation and distribution of Secret Shares is
logged.
When required, activation data for the RZ ZSK private keys is
transmitted directly from the Host IS platform to the HSM. This
transmission occurs on VeriSign's secure infrastructure.
5.4.2. Activation data protection
Shareholders are required to safeguard their Secret Shares and sign
an agreement acknowledging their Shareholder responsibilities.
Activation data for RZ ZSK private keys will be decommissioned using
methods that protect against the loss, theft, modification,
unauthorized disclosure, or unauthorized use of the private keys
protected by such activation data. After the record retention
periods in section 5.2.6 lapse, VeriSign will decommission activation
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data by overwriting and/or physical destruction.
5.4.3. Other aspects of activation data
Not applicable
5.5. Computer Security Controls
VeriSign ensures that the systems maintaining key software and data
files are Trustworthy Systems secure from unauthorized access. In
addition, VeriSign limits access to production servers to those
individuals with a valid business reason for such access. General
application users do not have accounts on production servers.
VeriSign requires the use of passwords that have a minimum character
length and a combination of alphanumeric and special characters.
VeriSign requires that passwords be changed on a periodic basis.
5.6. Network Security Controls
VeriSign performs all its online signing functions using networks
secured in accordance with the VeriSign Information and Physical
Security Policies to prevent unauthorized access and other malicious
activity. VeriSign protects its communications of sensitive
information through the use of encryption and digital signatures.
VeriSign's production network is logically separated from other
components. This separation prevents network access except through
defined application processes. VeriSign uses firewalls to protect
the production network from internal and external intrusion and limit
the nature and source of network activities that may access
production systems that are related to key signing activities.
5.7. Timestamping
Time derived from the procedure will be used for timestamping of
o electronic and paper based audit log records
o DNSSEC signatures expiration and inception times
Asserted times are required to be reasonably accurate.
5.8. Life Cycle Technical Controls
5.8.1. System development controls
Applications are developed and implemented by VeriSign in accordance
with VeriSign systems development and change management standards.
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All VeriSign software deployed on production systems can be traced to
version control repositories.
5.8.2. Security management controls
VeriSign has mechanisms and/or policies in place to control and
monitor the configuration of its systems. VeriSign creates a hash of
all software packages installed on production systems. This hash is
used to verify the integrity of such software.
5.8.3. Life cycle security controls
The signer system is designed to require a minimum of maintenance.
Updates critical to the security and operations of the signer system
will be applied after formal testing and approval. The origin of all
software and firmware will be securely authenticated by available
means.
Critical hardware components of the signer system (HSM) will be
procured directly from the manufacturer and transported in tamper-
evident bags to their destination in the secure facility. Any
hardware will be decommissioned well in time before the specified
life time expectancy.
6. ZONE SIGNING
The IANA Functions Operator (ICANN) provides the Root Zone Maintainer
(VRSN) with signed and valid DNSSEC RRset for the Root Zone ZSK
operator's current keys and the KSKs.
The Root Zone Maintainer includes this keyset into the Root Zone
file, adds the Next Secure resource records (NSEC) and creates
signatures for all relevant records. The Root Zone is then
distributed to the Root Server Operators.
The daily Root Zone signing will be conducted semi-automatically by
the system. It is not fully automatic since the interface with the
IANA Functions Operator is currently manual.
6.1. Key lengths and algorithms
Key pairs are required to be of sufficient length to prevent others
from determining the key pair's private key using crypto-analysis
during the period of expected utilization of such key pairs.
The current RZ ZSK key pair(s) is an RSA key pair, with a modulus
size of 1024 bits.
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6.2. Authenticated denial of existence
Authenticated denial of existence will be provided through the use of
NSEC resource records as specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].
6.3. Signature format
The cryptographic hash function used in conjunction with the signing
algorithm is required to be sufficiently resistant to preimage
attacks during the time of which the signature is valid.
The RZ ZSK signatures will be generated by encrypting SHA-256 hashes
using RSA [RFC5702].
6.4. Zone signing key roll-over
RZ ZSK rollover is carried out quarterly automatically by the system.
ZSK key signing is conducted manually every three months. The
necessary ZSKs to be used in between these gatherings are pre-
generated and signed at the same occasion with the projected
signature inception- and expiration time.
6.5. Key signing key roll-over
Refer to the Root Zone Key Signing Key Operator's DPS for details
[RZKSKDPS].
6.6. Signature life-time and re-signing frequency
The signing practice of the Root Zone is divided into quarterly
continuous time cycles of approximately 90 days. Time cycles begins
at the following dates each year:
January 1st
April 1st
July 1st
October 1st
For each of these time cycles there is a key ceremony scheduled
approximately 60 days, but no later than 33 days before the time
cycle commences. At this key ceremony, all of the necessary RZ KSK
operations are performed to enable the Root Zone Maintainer to
operate and publish the zone independently throughout period.
To facilitate automatic updates of resolvers Trust Anchors as
described in RFC 5011 [RFC5011], while minimizing the number of keys
in the key set, each of the ~90 days time cycle is divided into 10
day slots (9 slots).
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The time cycle will never be less than 90 days. If the time cycle is
more than 90 days, the last slot in the cycle will be expanded to
fill the period.
For each of these slots there is a pre-generated DNSKEY key set which
is signed at the key ceremony with 15 days validity time to allow for
up to 50% overlap. The Root Zone Maintainer is responsible for
selecting the current key set and publishing it with the
corresponding valid signature.
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
RRSIG 1 |---->|
RRSIG 2 |---->|
RRSIG 3 |---->|
RRSIG 4 |---->|
RRSIG 5 |---->|
RRSIG 6 |---->|
RRSIG 7 |---->|
RRSIG 8 |---->|
RRSIG 9 |---->|
DNSKEY RRSIG's validity period within the cycle
Figure 1
The Root Zone Maintainer may use slots at the edge of every time
cycle for pre- and post-publishing at RZ ZSK roll-overs.
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
ZSK n-1 ===|-->|
ZSK n ---|===================================|--->
ZSK n+1 |---|===>
(-) post- or pre-publish
(=) used for signing
90 day cycle with ZSK roll-over
Figure 2
In the event of a RZ ZSK roll-over, time slots are used for pre-
publish and post-publish in the following order;
Okubo, et al. [Page 30]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
Slot 1:
publish ZSK (n) + ZSK (n-1) + KSKs, sign zone with ZSK (n)
Slot 2-8:
publish ZSK (n) + KSKs, sign zone with ZSK (n)
Slot 9:
publish ZSK (n) + ZSK (n+1) + KSKs, sign zone with ZSK (n)
The Root Zone is then published. At each publication the Root Zone
Maintainer selects and includes the current DNSKEY RRset and
corresponding signature(s), and then signs all other authoritative
records within the root zone using the current RZ ZSK with a validity
period set to 7 days.
6.7. Verification of zone signing key set
Each key set within the Key Signing Request (KSR) is self-signed with
the active key to provide proof of possession of the corresponding
private key. The signer system will automatically validate this
signature and perform checking of available parameters before
accepting the KSR for signing.
The RZ KSK Operator will verify the authenticity of the KSR document
by performing an out-of-band verification (verbally over the phone,
by fax, or any other available method) of the hash of the KSR, before
entering the KSR into the signer system. The resulting Signed Key
Response (SKR) is transferred back using the same TLS client-side
authenticated connection used to receive the KSR from the Root Zone
Maintainer.
6.8. Verification of resource records
The signature verification will be performed using the published RZ
TA on the Extractor/Validator system, which holds both the signed
data and the unsigned data prior to the zone distribution in order to
carry out the verification. Prior to signing, the integrity of the
unsigned Root Zone is validated by a different system. The integrity
of the non-signed contents will also be performed as part of this
validation process.
Okubo, et al. [Page 31]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
6.9. Resource records time-to-live
+------------------------+---------------------------------+
| RRtype | TTL |
+------------------------+---------------------------------+
| DNSKEY | 48 hours |
| NSEC | same as SOA minimum (24 hours) |
| Delegation Signer (DS) | 24 hours |
| RRSIG | same as the covered RR (varies) |
+------------------------+---------------------------------+
7. COMPLIANCE AUDIT
An annual SysTrust audit for DNSSEC operations examination is
performed for VeriSign's data center operations and key management
operations supporting VeriSign's Root Zone Zone Signing services
including the RZ ZSK management.
7.1. Frequency of entity compliance audit
Compliance Audits are conducted at least annually at the sole expense
of the audited entity.
7.2. Identity/qualifications of auditor
VeriSign's compliance audits are performed by a public accounting
firm that: Demonstrates proficiency in DNSSEC public key
infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques,
security auditing, and the third-party attestation function, and is
accredited by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), which requires the possession of certain skill sets, quality
assurance measures such as peer review, competency testing, standards
with respect to proper assignment of staff to engagements, and
requirements for continuing professional education.
7.3. Auditor's relationship to audited party
Compliance audits of VeriSign's operations are performed by a public
accounting firm that is independent of VeriSign. Third party
auditors do not participate in the multi-person control for the RZ
ZSK.
7.4. Topics covered by audit
The scope of VeriSign's annual Compliance Audit includes all DNSSEC
operations such as key environmental controls, key management
operations, Infrastructure/Administrative controls, RZ ZSK and
Okubo, et al. [Page 32]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
signature life cycle management and practices disclosure.
7.5. Actions taken as a result of deficiency
With respect to compliance audits of VeriSign's operations,
significant exceptions or deficiencies identified during the
Compliance Audit will result in a determination of actions to be
taken. This determination is made by VeriSign management with input
from the auditor and DoC. VeriSign management is responsible for
developing and implementing a corrective action plan. If VeriSign or
the DoC determines that such exceptions or deficiencies pose an
immediate threat to the security or integrity of the RZ ZSK, a
corrective action plan will be developed within 30 days and
implemented within a commercially reasonable period of time. For
less serious exceptions or deficiencies, VeriSign Management will
evaluate the significance of such issues and determine the
appropriate course of action with DoC authorization.
7.6. Communication of results
A copy of Management's Assertion letter can be found at
https://www.verisign.com/repository/
8. LEGAL MATTERS
8.1. Fees
Not applicable
8.2. Financial responsibility
Not applicable
8.3. Confidentiality of business information
8.3.1. Scope of confidential information
The following records shall, be kept confidential and private
(Confidential/Private Information):
o Private keys and information needed to recover such Private Keys
o Transactional records (both full records and the audit trail of
transactions)
o Audit trail records created or retained by VeriSign
o Audit reports created by VeriSign (to the extent such reports are
maintained), or their respective auditors (whether internal or
public)
Okubo, et al. [Page 33]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
o Contingency planning and disaster recovery plans
o Security measures controlling the operations of VeriSign hardware
and software and the administration of DNS Keys
8.3.2. Information not within the scope of confidential information
All information pertaining to the database of top level domains is
public information. Public Keys, Key Revocation, and other status
information, VeriSign repositories and information contained within
them are not considered Confidential/Private Information.
8.3.3. Responsibility to protect confidential information
VeriSign secures confidential information from compromise and
disclosure to third parties.
8.4. Privacy of personal information
8.4.1. Information treated as private
Not applicable
8.4.2. Information not deemed private
Not applicable
8.4.3. Responsibility to protect private information
Not applicable
8.4.4. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process
VeriSign shall be entitled to disclose Confidential/Private
Information if, in good faith, VeriSign believes that disclosure is
necessary in response to judicial, administrative, or other legal
process during the discovery process in a civil or administrative
action, such as subpoenas, interrogatories, requests for admission,
and requests for production of documents.
8.5. Limitations of liability
VeriSign shall not be liable for any financial loss, or loss arising
from incidental damage or impairment, resulting from its performance
of its obligations hereunder or the IANA Functions Operator or the
Root Zone KSK Operator's performance of their respective obligations
under DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK operator. No
other liability, implicit or explicit, is accepted.
Okubo, et al. [Page 34]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
8.6. Term and termination
8.6.1. Term
The DPS becomes effective upon publication in the VeriSign
repository. Amendments to this DPS become effective upon publication
in the VeriSign repository.
8.6.2. Termination
This DPS as amended from time to time and will remain in force until
it is replaced by a new version.
8.6.3. Dispute resolution provisions
Disputes among DNSSEC participants shall be resolved pursuant to
provisions in the applicable agreements among the parties. Disputes
involving VeriSign require an initial negotiation period of sixty
(60) days followed by litigation in the federal or state court
encompassing Fairfax County, Virginia, in the case of claimants who
are U.S. residents, or, in the case of all other claimants,
arbitration administered by the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC") in accordance with the ICC Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration, unless otherwise approved by VeriSign.
8.6.4. Governing law
This DPS shall be governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of
Virginia.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
Trust Anchors", RFC 5011, September 2007.
[RFC5702] Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702,
October 2009.
Okubo, et al. [Page 35]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
9.2. Informative References
[RZKSKDPS]
Ljunggren, F., Okubo, T., Lamb, R., and J. Schlyter,
"DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK
Operator", May 2010.
Appendix A. Table of acronyms and definitions
A.1. Acronyms
Okubo, et al. [Page 36]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Term | Definition |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| AD | Authenticated Data Flag |
| AICPA | American Institute of Certified Public Accountants |
| BIND | Berkley Internet Name Domain |
| CC | Common Criteria |
| CD | Checking Disabled |
| DNS | Domain Name System |
| DNSKEY | Domain Name System Key |
| DNSSEC | Domain Name System Security Extensions |
| DO | DNSSEC OK |
| DoC | Department of Commerce |
| DPS | DNSSEC Policy and Practices Statement |
| DS | Delegation Signer |
| EAL | Evaluation Assurance Level (pursuant to the Common |
| | Criteria) |
| FIPS | Federal Information Processing Standards |
| FISMA | Federal Information Security Management Act |
| HSM | Hardware Security Module |
| IANA | Internet Assigned Numbers Authority |
| ICANN | Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers |
| ISO | International Organization for Standardization |
| NIST | National Institute of Standardization of Technology |
| NS | Name Server |
| NSEC | NextSecure |
| NSEC3 | NextSecure3 |
| NTIA | National Telecommunications and Information |
| | Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce. |
| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
| PMA | Policy Management Authority |
| RFC | Request for Comments |
| RZ | Root Zone |
| KSKO | Key Signing Key Operator |
| RRSIG | Resource Record Signature |
| RZMS | Root Zone Management System |
| SEP | Secure Entry Point |
| SHA | Secure Hash Algorithm |
| SOA | Start of Authority |
| SP | NIST Special Publication |
| TA | Trust Anchor |
| TLD | Top Level Domain |
| TSIG | Transaction Signature |
| TTL | Time To Live |
| VERT | VeriSign Emergency Response Team |
| VSIRT | VeriSign Security Incident Response Team |
| ZSKO | Zone Signing Key Operator |
+--------+----------------------------------------------------------+
Okubo, et al. [Page 37]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
A.2. Definitions
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| Term | Definition |
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| Chain of Trust | DNS keys, signatures and delegation signer |
| | records linked together forming a chain of |
| | signed data. |
| Compromise | A violation (or suspected violation) of a |
| | security policy, in which an unauthorized |
| | disclosure of, or loss of control over, |
| | sensitive information may have occurred. |
| | With respect to private keys, a Compromise |
| | is a loss, theft, disclosure, |
| | modification, unauthorized use, or other |
| | modification, unauthorized use, or other |
| | compromise of the security of such private |
| | key. |
| Compliance Audit | A periodic audit that a Processing Center, |
| | Service Center, Managed PKI Customer, or |
| | Gateway Customer undergoes to determine |
| | its conformance with standards that apply |
| | to it. |
| Confidential/Private | Information required to be kept |
| Information | confidential and private. |
| Delegation Signer | Delegation Signer is one of the resource |
| (DS) | (DS) records in the indicating that the |
| | delegated zone is digitally signed. It |
| | also assures that the parent zone |
| | recognizes the indicated key for the |
| | delegated zone. |
| Hardware Security | A type of secure crypto-processor aimed at |
| Module (HSM) | managing cryptographic keys and |
| | cryptographic operations while providing |
| | physical protection of the private keying |
| | material through tamper protecting |
| | mechanisms. |
| Intellectual | Rights under one or more of the following: |
| Property Rights | any copyright, patent, trade secret, |
| (IPR) | trademark, and any other intellectual |
| | property rights. |
| Island of Security | A signed zone that does not have a chain |
| | of trust from the parent zone. |
| Key Generation | A procedure whereby a key pair is |
| Ceremony | generated, its private key is transferred |
| | into a cryptographic module, its private |
| | key is backed up, and/or key sets are |
| | signed. |
Okubo, et al. [Page 38]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
| Key Signing Key | A key that signs the key set. |
| (KSK) | |
| Management Review | Compliance Audit of the entity or as part |
| | of the overall risk management process in |
| | the ordinary course of business. |
| Offline HSM | HSMs that are maintained offline for |
| | security reasons in order to protect them |
| | from possible attacks by intruders by way |
| | of the network. These HSMs do not |
| | directly sign the zone file. |
| Online HSM | HSMs that sign the Zone file under the |
| | Zone Signing Key are maintained online so |
| | as to provide continuous signing services. |
| Parent Zone | The zone which is one level higher. |
| Policy Management | The organization within VeriSign |
| Authority (PMA) | responsible for managing the DPS. |
| Public Key | The architecture, organization, |
| Infrastructure | techniques, practices, and procedures that |
| | collectively support the implementation |
| | and operation of a public key |
| | cryptographic system. |
| Regulated Financial | A financial institution that is regulated, |
| Institution | supervised, and examined by governmental, |
| | national, state or provincial, or local |
| | authorities having regulatory authority |
| | over such financial institution based on |
| | the governmental, national, state or |
| | provincial, or local laws under which such |
| | financial institution was organized and/or |
| | licensed. |
| Resource Record | Signature data in the zone file. |
| Signature (RRSIG) | |
| RSA | A public key cryptographic system invented |
| | by Rivest, Shamir and Adelman. |
| Root Zone Management | A system used to automate the Root Zone |
| System (RZMS) | update process requested by the IANA |
| | Functions Operator. |
| Secret Share | A portion of a private key or a portion of |
| | the activation data needed to operate a |
| | private key under a Secret Sharing |
| | arrangement. |
Okubo, et al. [Page 39]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
| SysTrust Assurance | SysTrust is an assurance service developed |
| | by American Institute of Certified Public |
| | Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian |
| | Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA). |
| | SysTrust is designed primarily to build |
| | trust and confidence among businesses |
| | depending on systems, addressing areas |
| | such as: security, availability, |
| | confidentiality, and processing integrity. |
| Supplemental Risk | A review of an entity by VeriSign |
| | following incomplete or exceptional |
| | findings in a Compliance Audit of the |
| | entity or as part of the overall risk |
| | management process in the ordinary course |
| | of business. |
| Trusted Anchor | A trust anchor is an authoritative entity |
| | represented via a public key. It is used |
| | in the context of public key |
| | infrastructures, X.509 digital |
| | certificates and DNSSEC. |
| Trusted Role | The roles within the DNSSEC operations |
| | that must be held by a Trusted Person. |
| Trusted Person | Personnel assigned to a Trusted Role who |
| | have successfully completed a a |
| | comprehensive background investigation as |
| | defined in Section 4.3.2, which indicates |
| | their ability to maintain the level of |
| | trust necessary for critical DNSSEC |
| | operations. |
| VeriSign | Means, with respect to each pertinent |
| | portion of this, VeriSign, Inc. and/or any |
| | wholly owned VeriSign subsidiary |
| | responsible for the specific operations at |
| | issue. |
| Repository | DNSSEC-related information made accessible |
| | online. |
| Zone | A boundary of responsibility for each |
| | domain. |
| Zone Signing Key | A key that signs the Root Zone |
| (ZSK) | |
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
Okubo, et al. [Page 40]
Root Zone ZSK DPS May 2010
Appendix B. History of changes
+---------------------------+-------------+
| Section | Description |
+---------------------------+-------------+
| Creation of first Edition | N/A |
+---------------------------+-------------+
Authors' Addresses
Tomofumi Okubo
VeriSign Inc.
21345 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166-6503
USA
Email: tookubo@verisign.com
Fredrik Ljunggren
Kirei AB
P.O. Box 53204
Goteborg SE-400 16
Sweden
Email: fredrik@kirei.se
Richard Lamb
Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers
4676 Admiralty Way, Suite 330
Marina del Ray, CA 90292
USA
Email: richard.lamb@icann.org
Jakob Schlyter
Kirei AB
P.O. Box 53204
Goteborg SE-400 16
Sweden
Email: jakob@kirei.se
Okubo, et al. [Page 41]
Presently we were in a very dark road, and at a point where it dropped suddenly between steep sides we halted in black shadow. A gleam of pale sand, a whisper of deep flowing waters, and a farther glimmer of more sands beyond them challenged our advance. We had come to a "grapevine ferry." The scow was on the other side, the water too shoal for the horses to swim, and the bottom, most likely, quicksand. Out of the blackness of the opposite shore came a soft, high-pitched, quavering, long-drawn, smothered moan of woe, the call of that snivelling little sinner the screech-owl. Ferry murmured to me to answer it and I sent the same faint horror-stricken tremolo back. Again it came to us, from not farther than one might toss his cap, and I followed Ferry down to the water's edge. The grapevine guy swayed at our side, we heard the scow slide from the sands, and in a few moments, moved by two videttes, it touched our shore. Soon we were across, the two videttes riding with us, and beyond a sharp rise, in an old opening made by the swoop of a hurricane, we entered the silent unlighted bivouac of Ferry's scouts. Ferry got down and sat on the earth talking with Quinn, while the sergeants quietly roused the sleepers to horse. Plotinus is driven by this perplexity to reconsider the whole theory of Matter.477 He takes Aristotle¡¯s doctrine as the groundwork of his investigation. According to this, all existence is divided into Matter and Form. What we know of things¡ªin other words, the sum of their differential characteristics¡ªis their Form. Take away this, and the unknowable residuum is their Matter. Again, Matter is the vague indeterminate something out of which particular Forms are developed. The two are related as Possibility to Actuality, as the more generic to the more specific substance through every grade of classification and composition. Thus there are two Matters, the one sensible and the other intelligible. The former constitutes the common substratum of bodies, the other the common element of ideas.478 The general distinction between Matter and Form was originally suggested to Aristotle by Plato¡¯s remarks on the same subject; but he differs325 from his master in two important particulars. Plato, in his Timaeus, seems to identify Matter with space.479 So far, it is a much more positive conception than the ?λη of the Metaphysics. On the other hand, he constantly opposes it to reality as something non-existent; and he at least implies that it is opposed to absolute good as a principle of absolute evil.480 Thus while the Aristotelian world is formed by the development of Power into Actuality, the Platonic world is composed by the union of Being and not-Being, of the Same and the Different, of the One and the Many, of the Limit and the Unlimited, of Good and Evil, in varying proportions with each other. The Lawton woman had heard of an officer's family at Grant, which was in need of a cook, and had gone there. [See larger version] On the 8th of July an extraordinary Privy Council was summoned. All the members, of whatever party, were desired to attend, and many were the speculations as to the object of their meeting. The general notion was that it involved the continuing or the ending of the war. It turned out to be for the announcement of the king's intended marriage. The lady selected was Charlotte, the second sister of the Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz. Apart from the narrowness of her education, the young princess had a considerable amount of amiability, good sense, and domestic taste. These she shared with her intended husband, and whilst they made the royal couple always retiring, at the same time they caused them to give, during their lives, a moral air to their court. On the 8th of September Charlotte arrived at St. James's, and that afternoon the marriage took place, the ceremony being performed by the Archbishop of Canterbury. On the 22nd the coronation took place with the greatest splendour. Mother and girls were inconsolable, for each had something that they were sure "Si would like," and would "do him good," but they knew Josiah Klegg, Sr., well enough to understand what was the condition when he had once made up his mind. CHAPTER V. THE YOUNG RECRUITS Si proceeded to deftly construct a litter out of the two guns, with some sticks that he cut with a knife, and bound with pawpaw strips. His voice had sunk very low, almost to sweetness. A soft flurry of pink went over her face, and her eyelids drooped. Then suddenly she braced herself, pulled herself taut, grew combative again, though her voice shook. HoME²Ô¾®Ïè̫ʲôÐÇ×ù
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